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Abstract: Philosophy is often divided into two traditions or camps: Analytic Philosophy and 
Continental Philosophy. Characterizing the so-called “Analytic-Continental divide,” however, 
and explaining the differences between these two philosophical traditions is no easy task. Some 
philosophers have argued that the differences have to do with the place of argument in the two 
traditions. This raises the following questions: Is Analytic Philosophy rife with arguments while 
Continental Philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in 
Analytic Philosophy and in Continental Philosophy? If so, which ones? Using data mining and 
text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR 
database (n = 53,260) in order to tackle these questions empirically. Using indicator words to 
classify arguments by type (deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we search through 
our corpus to find patterns of usage. Overall, the results of our empirical study suggest that there 
are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in Analytic Philosophy 
journal articles and the types of arguments advanced in Continental Philosophy journal articles. 
In fact, articles published in both AP journals and CP journals contain the three types of 
arguments we have looked at, namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments, with no 
significant differences in frequency. Our findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the 
hypothesis that the so-called split or divide between Analytic Philosophy and Continental 
Philosophy has something to do with the place of argument in these two philosophical traditions 
or camps. 
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Philosophy is often divided into two traditions or camps: Analytic Philosophy (AP) and 
Continental Philosophy (CP). As Chase and Reynolds (2011, p. 1) put it, “Anyone who works 
within academic philosophy is familiar with the (claimed) distinction between analytic or Anglo-
American philosophy and its so-called continental or European counterpart.” Similarly, 
according to Critchley (2001, p. 40), the “de facto divide between analytic and Continental 
philosophy can be observed in sundry philosophical epiphenomena such as job descriptions 
asking for ‘Continentalists’ and in publishers’ catalogues where special pages are given over to 
Continental philosophy, usually towards the back of the catalogue.” 
 
Characterizing the so-called “Analytic-Continental divide,” however, and explaining the 
differences between these two philosophical traditions is no easy task. After all, some European 
philosophers are considered analytic philosophers, whereas some Anglo-American philosophers 
are considered continental philosophers (Bell et al. 2016, p. 1). If there is a split between AP and 
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CP, then, it seems that it cannot be drawn simply along geographical lines (May 2002). As Levy 
(2003, p. 284) puts it: 
 
Since the early twentieth century, Western philosophy has been split into two apparently 
irreconcilable camps: the “analytic” and the “continental.” Philosophers who belong to 
each camp read and respond to their fellows almost exclusively; thus, each stream 
develops separately, and the differences become more entrenched. Relations between the 
camps are characterized largely by mutual incomprehension and not a little hostility. But 
because few philosophers are well acquainted with both dies, the nature of the split is not 
well understood (emphasis added).1 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the split, namely, the so-called 
“Analytic-Continental divide,” by taking an empirical approach. 
 
Some philosophers have argued that the differences between AP and CP have to do with 
the place of argument in these two philosophical traditions. That is, it has been argued that 
argument occupies a more important place in AP than in CP. In other words, analytic 
philosophers respect argument more than continental philosophers do, or so it has been argued. 
As Stevens (2013, p. 32) puts it: 
 
It is sometimes said that the two [i.e., AP and CP] differ by virtue of the role played by 
argument in each. Continental philosophers, it is sometimes said, are not playing the 
same game that analytic philosophers play; they do not employ arguments as the key 
element in their method (emphasis added). 
 
For example, according to Williams (2011, p. xvi), “What distinguishes analytical philosophy 
from other contemporary philosophy [...] is a certain way of going on, which involves argument, 
distinctions, and [...] moderately plain speech” (emphasis added). Likewise, Quinton (2005, p. 
170) claims that CP relies “on dramatic, even melodramatic, utterance rather than sustained 
rational argument” (emphasis added).2 Stevens (2013) himself goes on to claim that 
“Philosophical problems are addressed by argument, using the best logical resources for 
constructing those arguments available at the time” (p. 33) and that “if it really is the case that 
there are figures in the analytic tradition who reject argument then [...] it is only fair to describe 
them as having made a radical departure from traditional philosophy” (p. 33, note 9).3 Along the 
same lines, Levy (2003, p. 286) observes that some “features of CP [...] give the impression that 
it is argument free,” whereas some features of AP give the impression that it “is a new 
 
1 On the history of the split, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see Rockmore (2004). 
2 According to Humphries (1999, p. 265), “In some contemporary continental philosophy, there may be little 
emphasis given to strict argumentative protocols or to consequential discursive movement, and the attempt to win 
the reader’s conviction must use other, perhaps less transparent, means. Implicit here is a critique of the strategy of 
argumentation, which may itself too often fall short of the ideal of rational transparency” (emphasis added). 
3 In a book symposium on his What is Analytic Philosophy? (2008), Glock (2013) replies to Stevens (2013), 
although he seems to agree with Stevens about “the premium placed on argument and clarity” in AP (Glock 2013, p. 
36). For further discussion, see Zahavi (2016, pp. 79-93). 
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scholasticism, where the concern for technique overwhelms the very problem that the techniques 
had originally been designed to solve” (emphasis added).4 
 
All of this raises the following questions, which are the research questions that will guide 
our empirical study in this paper: 
 
1. Is Analytic Philosophy rife with arguments while Continental Philosophy is devoid of 
arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in Analytic Philosophy and in 
Continental Philosophy? 
2. If different types of arguments are made in Analytic Philosophy and in Continental 
Philosophy, which types of arguments are typically made in AP and which types of 
arguments are typically made in CP? Are there significant differences between the types 
of arguments typically made in AP versus those typically made in CP? 
 
We set out to investigate these questions empirically. Using data mining and text analysis 
methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 
53,260). Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and 
abductive arguments), we search through our corpus to find patterns of usage. Before we report 
the results of our empirical study in Section 3, we describe our methodology in more detail in 
Section 2. In Section 4, we will discuss how the results of our empirical study provide tentative 
answers to our research questions (1) and (2) above. Overall, the results of our empirical study 
suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in AP 
journal articles and the types of arguments advanced in CP journal articles. In fact, articles 
published in both AP journals and CP journals contain the three types of arguments we have 
looked at, namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments, with no significant differences 
in frequency. Our findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the so-
called split or divide between AP and CP has something to do with the place of argument in 
these two philosophical traditions or camps. 
2. Methods  
2.1 Background  
Introductory textbooks to logic, reasoning, and critical thinking typically contain a brief 
discussion of indicator words. There are premise indicators—words such as ‘because’ and 
phrases such as ‘inferred from’ and the like--which indicate a premise of an argument, and there 
are conclusion indicators—words such as ‘therefore’ and phrases such as ‘it follows that’ and the 
like--which indicate a conclusion of an argument. For example, Morrow and Weston (2011, p. 5) 
instruct students to look for indicator words in order to distinguish between premises and 
conclusions. According to Morrow and Weston (2011, p. 5): 
Some words or phrases are conclusion indicators. These are words or phrases that tell 
you that you're about to read or hear the conclusion of an argument. Other words or 
 
4 Cf. Milkov (2020, p. 219): “since regulative ideas guide continental philosophy, its practitioners offer insights that 
either are connected in closed (finite) systems [...] or are autonomous ideas with no logical connection to other of the 
same philosopher’s insights. Analytic philosophers, in contrast, endeavor to articulate their ideas in webs of logical 
connections.” 
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phrases are premise indicators. These tell you that you're about to read or hear a premise 
(emphasis in original). 
They then provide a list of premise indicators, which includes words like ‘because’ and ‘this 
follows from’, and a list of conclusion indicators, which includes words like ‘therefore’ and 
‘hence’ (Morrow and Weston 2011, p. 5). Likewise, according to Marcus (2018, pp. 9-10), 
“there are premise and conclusion indicators. ‘We may conclude that’ is used to indicate a 
conclusion. ‘This may be inferred from the fact that’ is used to indicate a premise.” 
In addition to helping students identify premises and conclusions of arguments, indicators 
also help students distinguish between deductive arguments and inductive arguments. For 
example, according to Baronett (2016, p. 23): 
to help identify arguments as either deductive or inductive, one thing we can do is look 
for key words or phrases. For example, the words ‘necessarily,’ ‘certainly,’ ‘definitely,’ 
and ’absolutely’ suggest a deductive argument. . . . On the other hand, the words 
‘probably,’ ’likely,’ ‘unlikely,’ ‘improbable,’ ‘plausible,’ and ’implausible’ suggest 
inductive arguments. 
Similarly, according to Hurley and Watson (2018, p. 35), “inductive indicators” include terms 
and phrases such as ‘probably’, ‘improbable’, ‘plausible’, ‘implausible’, ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’, and 
‘reasonable to conclude’, whereas “deductive indicators” include terms and phrases such as ‘it 
necessarily follows that’, ‘certainly’, ‘absolutely’, and ‘definitely’. 
We can use these deductive indicators and inductive indicators, then, to look for 
deductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts in much the same way that 
students use them to identify arguments in any text. To the aforementioned deductive and 
inductive indicators, we can also add indicators for abductive arguments, i.e., arguments in 
which the conclusion is supposed to be the best explanation for some phenomenon. Abductive 
indicators include phrases such as ‘account for’, ‘best explain’, ‘make sense of’, and ‘best 
explanation for’ (Overton 2013). The types of arguments we searched for in this empirical study 
and their associated indicators are listed in Table 1.5 
Table 1. Types of arguments and their indicator words with examples from philosophical texts  
Argument Types  Indicators  Examples  
Abductive  account for, best 
explain, makes 
sense of, best 
explanation for 
“The deliberate nature of evidence matters for its 
status as evidence because knowledge of its 
deliberate production matters for what best 
explains the existence of the evidence” (Keren 
2012, p. 702). 
 
5 Ashton and Mizrahi (2018, p. 58) use a similar methodology to test the hypothesis that “philosophy is a priori and 
in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair.” 
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“even if one grant that some necessary work is 
now intrinsically defeative of the good life, it 
does not absolutely follow that it is necessary for 
men to do that work” (Smith 1924, pp. 552-553). 
Inductive  likely, unlikely, 
probably, 
improbable 
“It is therefore unlikely that there is a single 
complete and fixed commentary per model, 
stable across audiences and contexts” (Maki 
2009, p. 39). 
  
In order to make sure that our indicators for argument types (see Table 1) actually 
indicate arguments in the corpus, we anchor them to argument indicators, i.e., to words such as 
‘therefore’, ‘hence’, and the like. This procedure results in the argument indicator pairs listed in 
Table 2. By searching for these argument indicator pairs (as listed in Table 2) in our corpus, we 
can find out what types of arguments philosophers make in their published works and with what 
frequency. 
Table 2. Indicator pairs for deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments  
Deductive indicator pairs  Inductive indicator pairs  Abductive indicator pairs  
therefore necessarily  therefore probably  therefore account for  
therefore certainly  therefore likely  therefore best explain  
therefore definitely  therefore unlikely  therefore make sense of  
therefore absolutely  therefore improbable  therefore best explanation for  
hence necessarily  hence probably  hence account for  
hence certainly  hence likely  hence best explain  
hence definitely  hence unlikely  hence make sense of  
hence absolutely  hence improbable  hence best explanation for  
so necessarily  so probably  so account for  
so certainly  so likely  so best explain  
so definitely  so unlikely  so make sense of  
so absolutely  so improbable  so best explanation for  
consequently necessarily  consequently probably  consequently account for  
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consequently certainly  consequently likely  consequently best explain  
consequently definitely  consequently unlikely  consequently make sense of  
consequently absolutely  consequently improbable  consequently best explanation for  
proves necessarily  proves probably  proves account for  
proves certainly  proves likely  proves best explain  
proves definitely  proves unlikely  proves make sense of  
proves absolutely  proves improbable  proves best explanation for  
thus necessarily  thus probably  thus account for  
thus certainly  thus likely  thus best explain  
thus definitely  thus unlikely  thus make sense of  
thus absolutely  thus improbable  thus best explanation for  
follows necessarily  follows probably  follows account for  
follows certainly  follows likely  follows best explain  
follows definitely  follows unlikely  follows make sense of  
follows absolutely  follows improbable  follows best explanation for  
accordingly necessarily  accordingly probably  accordingly account for  
accordingly certainly  accordingly likely  accordingly best explain  
accordingly definitely  accordingly unlikely  accordingly make sense of  
accordingly absolutely  accordingly improbable  accordingly best explanation for  
infer necessarily  infer probably  infer account for  
infer certainly  infer likely  infer best explain  
infer definitely  infer unlikely  infer make sense of  
infer absolutely  infer improbable  infer best explanation for  
 
Of course, we must keep in mind that the aforementioned abductive, deductive, and 
inductive indicator words are just that--indicators. That is, they are not sure signs for the 
presence (or absence) of arguments in texts. As Hurley and Watson (2018, p. 16) puts it, “the 
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mere occurrence of an indicator word by no means guarantees the presence of an argument.” 
Conversely, the mere absence of an indicator word by no means guarantees the lack of an 
argument. Nevertheless, indicator words are still useful and reliable indicators for the presence of 
arguments in text, which is why introductory textbooks to logic and philosophy instruct students 
to look for them. As Lepore and Cumming (2013, p. 6) put it, “Although there are no sure signs 
of whether an argument is present, fairly reliable indicators exist.” Indeed, Lepore and Cumming 
(2013, p. 6) proceed to list some of the aforementioned indicator words as well as those listed in 
Tables 1 and 2.6 
In order to find answers to research questions (1) and (2) above, we need to be able to 
distinguish between not only types of arguments (i.e., deductive, inductive, or abductive 
arguments) but also types of journals. More specifically, we need to tag the journals in our 
corpus as analytic or continental to be able to say what types of arguments are made in Analytic 
Philosophy (AP) and Continental Philosophy (CP). Some philosophy journals state their aim to 
publish AP explicitly (e.g., Analysis), whereas other philosophy journals state their aim to 
publish CP explicitly (e.g., Diderot Studies). We characterized such journals as either AP or CP. 
Our corpus contains six philosophy journals whose explicit aim is to publish work in CP. We 
matched those six CP journals with six AP journals. We selected the six AP journals from 
popular lists of AP journals perceived to be the best in the field, such as the lists commonly 
found on Brian Leiter’s blog.7 This procedure results in the AP and CP journals listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Philosophy journals that publish work in Analytic Philosophy (AP) and those that 
publish work in Continental Philosophy (CP) 
Analytic Philosophy Journals  Continental Philosophy Journals 
Analysis Diderot Studies 
Mind Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 
Noûs Journal of Nietzsche Studies 
Philosophical Studies The Pluralist 
The Journal of Philosophy Research in Phenomenology 
The Philosophical Review Sartre Studies International 
 
2.2 Text-Mining Methods  
A combination of several text-mining packages in R Language were used to manipulate the   
corpus of philosophical texts throughout this study. RStudio was used as an interactive-
development environment to process the data. The corpus of documents included a .txt file 
 
6 Ashton and Mizrahi (2018, p. 62) use indicator words to test the hypothesis that “philosophy is a priori and in the 
business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair.” In this study, we have scaled up their methodology to 
include abductive arguments in addition to deductive arguments and inductive arguments. 
7 See, for example, this list: https://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2018/11/best-general-journals-of-philosophy-
2018.html.  
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containing the full-text of the philosophical work, and a corresponding .xml file to the full-text 
file comprised of metadata information about each text file. 
The readtext package was utilized to load the text files into the RStudio environment. 
The readtext function takes a folder path as an input parameter, i.e., readtext(“filepath”). The 
readtext() function will then load all files in the target folder into RStudio as a dataframe. The 
dataframe will consist of two columns. The first column is titled “doc_id” and it lists the file 
names as individual elements within a string vector. The second column is titled “text” and it 
includes the full-text from each of the individual text files as a single character string. The result 
is a vector of character strings, with each string containing the full-text of an input text file. The 
.xml files were converted to .txt files from the Windows Command Prompt application as well as 
read into R using the readtext() function. 
To search for indicator pairs within the full-text documents, the string_detect() function 
from the stringr package was used in combination with a regular expression as a pattern search 
parameter. The argument indicator root and anchor were included within the regular expression 
to search for specific words. 
The regular expression pattern allowed for the root of the argument indicator pairs to both 
precede and follow the anchor word(s) within a certain range of words, exclusively. The function 
was applied to the corpus across three word-ranges. The ranges selected permitted 3, 6, or 10 
words between the argument indicator root and the anchor word(s). For example, to search for 
pattern matches across a range of 3 words, the regular expression returns a positive match in the 
following cases: 
Root word1 word2 word3 Anchor | OR | Anchor word1 word2 word3 Root  
Any pattern in which the argument indicator roots and anchors are separated by less than the 
maximum range (i.e., 3, 6 or 10) is also considered a positive match. For example, as applied 
within a 3-word maximum range, the following case would be considered a positive match:  
Anchor word1 word2 Root  
Applied in this manner, the string_detect() function will return a list of TRUE or FALSE logical 
values, where TRUE indicates the presence of the argument indicator and the anchor at least one 
time within each document and FALSE indicates no pattern match. The logical values were then 
converted to numeric data, with 1 replacing TRUE and 0 replacing FALSE. This detection 
process was repeated for each indicator pair for each of the deductive, inductive, and abductive 
lists and across all three word-ranges. The resulting lists were then summed, and the number of 
positive matches were recorded to a separate .csv file. 
Separate .csv files containing matched full-text documents across each of the word-
ranges were also generated from these lists. Journal titles for the specific publications under 
analysis in this study were then extracted from the metadata file for each item in the corpus. The 
total number of items for each journal within the corpus was calculated. Additionally, the total 
number of articles containing indicator-pair matches across each word-range and argument type 
was then calculated. Ratios were then calculated from the total number of items per publication 
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and the number of matches for each argument type and word-range. These ratios were then 
analyzed for statistical significance and visualized. 
3. Results 
In searches permitting three words between argument indicator root and anchor, the ratio of 
deductive arguments is always higher than the ratio of inductive arguments or the ratio of 
abductive arguments, whether in AP journals or CP journals, with the exception of the CP 
journal, The Pluralist, in which the ratio of inductive arguments is higher than the ratio of 
deductive arguments or the ratio of abductive arguments. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Ratios of deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments in search results permitting 




A Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive arguments in AP 
journal articles and in CP journal articles from the results of searches allowing a 3-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of deductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.11, SD = 0.04) and the ratios of deductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.09, SD = 0.04), t(10) = 0.73, p = 0.47. Likewise, a Welch’s t-test was conducted 
to compare the ratios of inductive arguments in AP journal articles and in CP journal articles 
from the results of searches allowing a 3-word maximum range. There was no significant 
difference between the ratios of inductive arguments in AP journal articles (M = 0.06, SD = 0.03) 
and the ratios of inductive arguments in CP journal articles (M = 0.05, SD = 0.02), t(10) = 0.98, p 
= 0.34. Finally, a Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of abductive arguments in 









































maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of abductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.02, SD = 0.01) and the ratios of abductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.02, SD = 0.01), t(10) = -0.008, p = 0.99. These results suggest that there are no 
significant differences between the types of arguments that are typically found in AP journal 
articles and the types of arguments that are typically found in CP journal articles. 
 
In searches permitting six words between argument indicator root and anchor, the ratio of 
deductive arguments is always higher than the ratio of inductive arguments or the ratio of 
abductive arguments, whether in AP journals or CP journals, with the exception of the CP 
journal, The Pluralist, in which the ratio of inductive arguments is higher than the ratio of 
deductive arguments or the ratio of abductive arguments. See Figure 2. This pattern is similar to 
the one observed in the data from our 3-word dataset. 
 
Figure 2. Ratios of deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments in search results permitting six 




A Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive arguments in AP 
journal articles and in CP journal articles from the results of searches allowing a 6-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of deductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.17, SD = 0.06) and the ratios of deductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.15, SD = 0.07), t(10) = 0.57, p = 0.58. Likewise, a Welch’s t-test was conducted 
to compare the ratios of inductive arguments in AP journal articles and in CP journal articles 
from the results of searches allowing a 6-word maximum range. There was no significant 
difference between the ratios of inductive arguments in AP journal articles (M = 0.11, SD = 0.04) 







































= 0.49. Finally, a Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of abductive arguments in 
AP journal articles and in CP journal articles from the results of searches allowing a 6-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of abductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.03, SD = 0.02) and the ratios of abductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.02, SD = 0.02), t(10) = 0.59, p = 0.56. These results are consistent with the results 
obtained from our 3-word dataset. They suggest again that there are no significant differences 
between the types of arguments that are typically found in AP journal articles and the types of 
arguments that are typically found in CP journal articles. 
 
In searches permitting ten words between argument indicator root and anchor, the ratio of 
deductive arguments is always higher than the ratio of inductive arguments or the ratio of 
abductive arguments, whether in AP journals or CP journals, with the exception of the CP 
journal, The Pluralist, in which the ratio of inductive arguments is higher than the ratio of 
deductive arguments or the ratio of abductive arguments. See Figure 3. Again, this is the same 
pattern observed in the data from our 3-word and 6-word datasets. 
 
Figure 3. Ratios of deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments in search results permitting 




A Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive arguments in AP 
journal articles and in CP journal articles from the results of searches allowing a 10-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of deductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.24, SD = 0.08) and the ratios of deductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.22, SD = 0.1), t(10) = 0.44, p = 0.66. Likewise, a Welch’s t-test was conducted to 










































the results of searches allowing a 10-word maximum range. There was no significant difference 
between the ratios of inductive arguments in AP journal articles (M = 0.16, SD = 0.07) and the 
ratios of inductive arguments in CP journal articles (M = 0.12, SD = 0.07), t(10) = 0.86, p = 0.4. 
Finally, a Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of abductive arguments in AP 
journal articles and in CP journal articles from the results of searches allowing a 10-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between the ratios of abductive arguments 
in AP journal articles (M = 0.05, SD = 0.03) and the ratios of abductive arguments in CP journal 
articles (M = 0.05, SD = 0.03), t(10) = 0.21, p = 0.83. These results are consistent with the results 
obtained from our 3-word and 6-word datasets. They suggest again that there are no significant 
differences between the types of arguments that are typically found in AP journal articles and the 




As discussed in Section 1, some philosophers hypothesize that the so-called split or divide 
between Analytic Philosophy (AP) and Continental Philosophy (CP) has to do with the place of 
argument in these two philosophical traditions or camps. More explicitly, the hypothesis is that 
argument occupies a more important place in AP than in CP; that is, analytic philosophers 
respect argument more than continental philosophers do. Accordingly, our empirical study was 
designed to address the following research questions about the so-called “Analytic-Continental 
divide”: 
 
1. Is AP rife with arguments while CP is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of 
arguments be found in AP and in CP? 
2. If different types of arguments are made in AP and in CP, which types of arguments are 
typically made in AP and which types of arguments are typically made in CP? Are there 
significant differences between the types of arguments typically made in AP versus those 
typically made in CP? 
 
The results of our empirical study suggest the following tentative answers to these research 
questions. Our results suggest that articles published in both AP journals and CP journals contain 
arguments. Moreover, our data reveal no significant differences between the types of arguments 
advanced in articles published in AP journals and the types of arguments advanced in articles 
published in CP journals. In fact, both AP and CP journal articles contain the three types of 
arguments we have looked at, namely, deductive arguments, inductive arguments, and abductive 
arguments, with no significant differences in frequency. Since we have observed these patterns 
in our 3-word, 6-word, and 10-word datasets, we can be quite confident that these results are 
robust. 
 
Our findings, then, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the so-called split 
or divide between AP and CP has something to do with the place of argument in these two 
philosophical traditions or camps. If anything, our findings could be reasonably construed as 
empirical evidence against this hypothesis. For, if the so-called split or divide between AP and 
CP had something to do with the place of argument in these two philosophical traditions or 
camps, such that AP is rife with arguments, whereas CP is devoid of arguments, then we would 
expect to see articles published in AP journals containing significantly more arguments than 
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articles published in CP journals. But that is not what we find. In fact, we have found that articles 
published in both AP journals and CP journals contain mostly deductive arguments, followed by 
inductive arguments, and then abductive arguments, with no significant differences in the 
frequencies with which these argument types occur in AP journal articles versus CP journal 
articles. 
 
The interesting exception to these patterns, which again are quite robust as they are 
observed in our 3-word, 6-word, and 10-word datasets, is The Pluralist. Unlike the other 
philosophy journals examined in this empirical study, articles published in The Pluralist contain 
more inductive arguments than either deductive arguments or abductive arguments. Although the 
differences in the proportions of deductive arguments and inductive arguments are not 
statistically significant in the 3-word (z = 0.14, p = 0.88, two-sided), the 6-word (z = 1.35, p = 
0.17, two-sided), and the 10-word (z = 1.69, p = 0.09, two-sided) datasets. The reason for this 
may have something to do with the fact that The Pluralist aims to publish works from a plurality 
of philosophical perspectives and traditions. As its official statement of aim and scope states: 
 
The Pluralist is a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to advancing the ends of philosophical 
thought and dialogue in all widely used philosophical methodologies, including non-
Western methods and those of traditional cultures. The journal upholds the Socratic 
dictum of self-knowledge and the love of wisdom as the purpose of philosophy. It seeks 
to express philosophical insights and concerns humanely and with an eye to literary as 
well as philosophical excellence, but technical papers are welcome. The Pluralist is a 
forum for discussion of diverse philosophical standpoints and pluralism's merits. The 
Pluralist considers high-quality submissions on any philosophical topic written from any 
philosophical perspective. Articles that defend some type of pluralism, apply a pluralistic 
perspective to contemporary issues, or take a critical stance against pluralism are 
encouraged.8 
 
It would be interesting to find out, we submit, whether other philosophy journals that encourage 
this sort of pluralism about philosophical perspectives, traditions, and methodologies also 
publish articles that advance more inductive arguments than deductive arguments or abductive 
arguments, as the traditionally AP or traditionally CP journals apparently do. We leave this 
question to future studies. 
 
An anonymous reviewer kindly suggested another interesting avenue of further research. 
If we look at subfields within philosophy, would we find any significant differences in the types 
of arguments made within those subfields? We could do that by focusing on specialized (rather 
than general) journals that publish articles in some specific area within philosophy. For example, 
using the methods outlined in Section 2, we could collect data from ethics journals, such as 
Ethics and Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, and philosophy of science journals, such as The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Science, and then compare the 
datasets. Would we find any significant differences between the types of arguments made in 
articles published in ethics journals and those made in articles published in philosophy of science 
journals? We leave this question to future studies as well. 
 
 
8 Available at: https://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/plur.html.  
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It is important to note that our empirical findings could be reasonably interpreted as 
constituting some negative evidence against the hypothesis that the so-called split or divide 
between AP and CP has something to do with the place of argument in these two philosophical 
traditions or camps, but they do not amount to a conclusive refutation of this hypothesis. This is 
because it is open to anyone who would like to challenge our empirical findings to reject any one 
of the methodological assumptions of our empirical study. For example, one could reject our 
methodological assumption that the indicator words listed in Table 1 are reliable indicators of 
abductive, deductive, and inductive arguments in philosophical texts, even though they are 




Philosophy is often divided into two traditions or camps: Analytic Philosophy (AP) and 
Continental Philosophy (CP). Characterizing the so-called “Analytic-Continental divide,” 
however, and explaining the differences between these two philosophical traditions is no easy 
task. Some philosophers have argued that the differences have to do with the place of argument 
in these two philosophical traditions. This raises the following questions: Is AP rife with 
arguments while CP is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in AP 
and in CP? If so, which ones? 
 
Using data mining and text analysis methods, we studied a large corpus of philosophical 
texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) in order to address these questions 
empirically. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (deductive, inductive, and 
abductive arguments), we searched through our corpus to find patterns of usage. Overall, the 
results of our empirical study suggest that there are no significant differences between the types 
of arguments advanced in AP journal articles and the types of arguments advanced in CP journal 
articles. In fact, articles published in both AP and CP journals contain the three types of 
arguments we have looked at, namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments, with no 
significant differences in frequency. Our findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the 
hypothesis that the so-called split or divide between AP and CP has something to do with the 
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